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Economics deals with the allocation of scarce resources
among many consumer goals. Water is a scarce resource
in the southwestern states and a plentiful resource in the
humid eastern states. Scarcity, however, is a relative term.
For example, in Arizona, ground water was available in vast
amounts during the first half of the 20th century.
Nevertheless, with the growth of cities, industries, and
mines in the second half of the 20th century demand for
water intensified, thus rendering ground water in Arizona a
scarce resource. As demand for water intensified, markets
for water rights evolved in the Southwest United States.
Yoram Barzel (1989) offers the following hypothesis about
why and when people may invest efforts in obtaining
rights:

on both the riparian and the appropriative rules. The
Pacific Coast states (California, Oregon, and Washington),
the Great Plains states (Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas,
Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota) adopted the
California doctrine. These states have great heterogeneity
in natural water supplies. However, over the years the
California-doctrine states have been slowly converging to
the Colorado doctrine. For example, in 1967 Texas
upgraded its surface water from the English to the prior
appropriation doctrine.
In California, the public
reclamation districts authorized by federal and state
legislation, own most of the irrigation water. The rapidly
increasing value of water since 1980 led to legislation that
started the decentralization of the process of water
transfers by empowering the reclamation districts to serve
as brokers between individual users. The aim of this
legislation has been to encourage water transfer from low
to high value uses. The implication of the Barzel rule is
that with intensification of the demand for water in the
southwestern states, the prior appropriation doctrine will
replace the remnants of the riparian doctrine. In particular,
California water users will desert their scramble water law
and accept the appropriative market system. I believe that
in the future, facing a growing demand for water, following
the Barzel rule, water users will continue to take steps
leading eventually to a water market based on the prior
appropriation doctrine. The rest of this paper is devoted
to an informal discussion of the doctrine.

People acquire, maintain, and relinquish rights as a
matter of choice. Individuals take such actions
directly in the private sector. Indirectly through the
state, in the public sector. People choose to exercise
rights when they believe the gains from such
actions will exceed their costs. Conversely, people
fail to exercise rights when the gains from owning
properties are deemed insufficient, thus placing (or
leaving) such properties in the public domain. What
is found in the public domain, therefore, is what
people have chosen not to claim (1989, Chapter 5, p.
65).
Water rights in the arid Southwest were created by
American settlers who moved west in the middle of the
nineteenth century and brought with them the riparian
system, which is governed by the English common law.
As demand for water intensified, the common law became
incongruous with the arid southwest, and over the years,
the most arid states abandoned the riparian doctrine and
instead adopted the prior appropriation doctrine. The
origins of the prior appropriation doctrine are traced to
miners who initially swept into the California gold fields in
1849. They established de facto rules for protecting rights
to use water. The first user was protected against a later
arrival-the law of first in use, first in right. Later, the
appropriative doctrine was adopted to ground water, and it
became known as the Colorado doctrine. The mountain
states (New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Colorado,
Idaho, Wyoming and Montana) completely rejected the
riparian doctrine and basically adopted the Colorado
doctrine. The humid eastern states have the riparian
doctrine. The California doctrine is a system that relies

SURFACE WATER
Surface-water rights evolved earlier than ground water
rights. The most arid states in the Southwest adopted the
prior appropriation doctrine to surface water either at the
end of the 19th century or at the start of 20th century. The
adoption of the prior appropriation doctrine to ground
water occurred later in the 20th century. For example, New
Mexico enacted its appropriative Surface-Water Code in
1907.
Later, in 1931, New Mexico enacted the
Underground Water Law that adapted the state’s surface
law to ground water. To understand why surface-water
rights predated ground water rights, consider a fully used
stream. The threat from upstream surface-water capture is
immediate. An upstream river user can increase his or her
level of irrigation only by depriving downstream users of
sufficient flows. The appropriative system protects users
from capture by assigning water rights based on
consumptive use.

24

Irrigation water diverted from the stream moves into canals
and from there onto farm fields. Water not consumed by
crops or evaporated moves off the fields or through the
root zone into drains and back to the stream. This process
is repeated downstream of each user. Water is “recycled”
in the sense that some of it is used and reused. Thus, if
the ith agricultural user diverts S i acre feet of water per
year, the consumptive use of this user is

water along the stream is examined by the state engineer.
If the application is in proper form, it appears for three
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the stream
vicinity in which the transfer is proposed.
Finally, if user

his/her water rights to user j with a return-flow coefficient
of R j , user j may increase his diversion by

(1 - Ri ) S i ,

Ri is the return-flow coefficient of this user.

where

i with a return-flow coefficient of Ri sells

Sj =

Suppose the return-flow coefficient for irrigation is
estimated at 1/5. A farmer who diverts 100 acre feet
consumes only 80 acre feet. Put differently, if this farmer
owns 80 acre feet of consumptive use rights, he or she is
allowed to divert a maximu m of 100 acre feet. The typical
return-flow coefficient of a non farm user, e.g., a city, could
be as high as 0.5.

S i (1 - Ri )
.
(1 - R j )

User i should decrease his/her water diversion by

S i acre

feet. Indeed, during most of the 20th century cities,
farmers, manufacturers, and miners in New Mexico have
traded water rights in a lively and active markets. All water
transfers in New Mexico were governed by Equation (2).

Following Johnson, Gisser, and Werner (1981), consider a
INSTREAM WATER RIGHTS

Ŝ acre feet, and
there is a compact agreement, or a treaty calling for S acre
stream in which the flow at the source is

The demand for instream flows is derived from recreation
activities and our desire to preserve wildlife and aesthetic
enjoyments-the non-traditional water uses. The problem
of instream flows has become acute during the recent
decades because the demand for the non-traditional water
uses has intensified with the population growth and rising
standard of living. To illustrate the instream problem,
consider the hypothetical illustration in the previous
section. Suppose, one day, a group of environmentalists
decides that a flow of 70 acre feet between the two points
of diversion is insufficient to support wildlife and fish in
the stream. For instance, if free and indiscriminate claiming
of instream inflow rights were permitted, the
environmentalists could claim rights to 75 acre feet of flow,
attempting to force the user upstream to reduce his
consumptive use from 30 to 25 acre feet. This is an
opportunistic behavior that must result in heavy legal
costs and eventual political struggles. An efficient
solution that relies on the market would require
individuals, groups, or governmental agencies interested
in augmenting instream flows, to purchase water rights on
the open market from users upstream and sell these rights
to users downstream.
Such “pro-environment”
transactions would be approved by the state engineer
provided they are not detrimental to a third party. In our
hypothetical example, the environmentalists should
purchase 5 acre feet of consumptive use from the user near
the source of the stream, and sell these rights to the user
downstream. The user upstream would not be allowed to
purchase water from the downstream user because this
would violate the rights of the environmentalists and
recreationists to 75 acre feet of instream flows.

feet per year. Assuming no evaporation and no
augmentation to the flow below the headwater, the
property rights of the n users along the stream would be
protected from capture if the following equation is
satisfied:

Sˆ -

n

∑ (1 -

Ri )( S i ) ≥ S .

i =1

As a simple illustration, consider a hypothetical stream
with only two users in which the flow at the source is 100
acre feet of water, with a legal obligation to leave an annual
flow of 60 acre feet at some point downstream. A user
located near the source diverts 40 acre feet and returns to
the stream 10 acre feet. His consumptive use rights
amount to 30 acre feet, leaving a flow of 70 acre feet in the
stream. At a point downstream, another user who owns 10
acre feet of consumptive use rights, diverts 30 acre feet
and returns to the stream 20 acre feet, thus leaving 60 acre
feet of water as called for by the compact.
Johnson, Gisser, and Werner (1981) also provided analysis
showing that a market for water rights that is based on
consumptive use is economically efficient.
They
discussed an additional constraint that requires that at any
point of diversion the stream flow is greater than the
diversion. In rare occasions, this flow constraint could be
violated if a user upstream were to purchase large
quantities of water rights from a user downstream, thus
leaving a user in the middle of the stream with insufficient
flows. The New Mexico water law recognizes the issue of
flow constraints. To protect third parties-users in the
middle-from flow deficiencies, any application to transfer
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n

GROUND WATER

∑ (1 -

Ri )( S i ) ≥ N.

i =1

In the early stages of mining an aquifer, the threat of
ground water capture from any group of users is not
immediate. Historically, given the enormous size of most
aquifers compared with water depletion, if some users were
to increase today their ground water pumping, the impact
tomorrow on other users would be an infinitesimal
lowering of the water table. Consequently, before
embarking on expensive demarcation of ground water
rights, farmers would simply be content with inexpensive
well spacing regulation. Furthermore, since most aquifers
had been only infinitesimally affected by droughts, there
has been no sense of urgency among users. Growing
demand for water by cities, mines, and industries, coupled
to falling water tables, would eventually pose a serious
threat of ground water capture and consequently induce
farmers to seek a more protective system of ground water
rights. In Arizona, some copper-mining companies
attempted to capture ground water rights from farmers by
exploiting the ambiguity of the English Doctrine. This
resulted in a political earthquake that gave birth to 1980
Ground water Management Act (GMA). The GMA
contains some elements of the appropriative doctrine, but
it is regulatory in nature.

The left side of the inequality is the sum of the water
pumped by all users less what is returned to the aquifer.
The right side is the net natural recharge. If the left side
pumpage minus return flows exceeds the right side natural
recharge mining of ground water occurs. If the two sides
are equal, the aquifer has achieved a steady state, also
known as self yield. Obviously, if ground water is mined,
the water table falls and the marginal cost of pumping
water increases. As the marginal cost of pumping rises,
individual users economize in water consumption. To
explain what must happen in the future, we need graphic
illustration. In Figure 1 time is measured along the
horizontal axis, and the depth of the water table, H, along
the vertical axis. If the aquifer is not sufficiently deep, say
it has a bottom at H m feet below the surface, the water
table trajectory reaches the bottom of the aquifer at point
A. Clearly, at point A some junior ground water rights must
n

be retired to bring the net pumping,

∑ (1 -

Ri )( S i ) ,

i =1

into line with the net natural recharge, N. The water table
trajectory is H 0 A H m . At this point it should be
stressed that the bottom of the aquifer is defined in
engineering and economic terms, not physical terms. The
reason for this is that pumping is inefficient in the bottom
portion of the aquifer.

Let net natural recharge, return-flow coefficient and water
pumped be denoted by, N, R and S, respectively. Consider
the following simplified expression for n ground water
users overlying a certain aquifer

[Figure 1]
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If the aquifer is sufficiently deep, say it is

transactions between any two users are governed by
Equation (2).

H m′ feet below

the surface, a steady state will eventually be reached when
water pumping will be reduced such that the left side of
Inequality (3) is equal to its right side. The water table
trajectory would be H 0 AB, approaching the level H s

A transfer of ground water from one aquifer to another, or
surface water from one stream to another, requires
exporting water via pipe, or a similar conveyance system.
For example, consider user i with a return-flow coefficient
of 0.5, pumping from aquifer A, selling 50 acre feet of
consumptive use to user j with a return-flow coefficient of
1/3, pumping from aquifer B. User i should reduce his/her
water pumping by 100 acre feet; user j should increase his
pumping by 75 acre feet; to protect the rights of third
parties who overlie aquifer B, user i should export 50 acre
feet via pipe to user j.

asymptotically.
For three decades natural-resources economists focused
on the issue of optimal mining of water, and designed
optimal control schemes for ground water management for
commonly used aquifers. David Sanchez and I (1980)
could show, that under the assumption of exclusiveness
and a stable demand-for-water, “temporal optimal control
of ground water would not enhance the welfare of farmers
compared with a strategy of free markets (1980).”
Meanwhile, wise policy makers designed reasonable
systems that assigned property rights to ground water
mining. As I detailed in a later paper (1983), in New Mexico
ground water rights were assigned to farmers who overlie
the Ogallala Aquifer based on acreage and crops. For
example, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, water rights
were determined at 2.5 acre feet of consumptive use per
irrigated acre. Ground water rights were assigned to non
farm users based on average use over a certain period. To
estimate the future date of reaching the bottom of the
aquifer (point A in Figure 1) the New Mexico state engineer
took the following two steps: First, he calculated the
remaining stock of ground water by multiplying the
average thickness of the aquifer by its area and then by its
storativity coefficient. The state engineer reserved the
bottom one third of the aquifer for reasons mentioned
above. Second, he divided the remaining stock by the
total annual consumptive water rights to obtain the time to
exhaustion. Because the falling water table must lead to
rising marginal cost of pumping, this estimate was an
understatement. Nevertheless, in New Mexico the State
Engineer demonstrated that property rights can be
assigned to mining ground water.

MEASUREMENT
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, water rights are not
appurtenant to the land. Nevertheless, measurement of
surface water use is costly. Assume that farm land has no
alternative use yet its marginal product is positive; to
maximize his profit, if measurement is costless, a farmer
selling some of his water rights should “spread” his
remaining water over his entire lot. Nevertheless, because
of high measurement costs of surface water, the most
prevalent form of transfer is a transaction in which one
farmer sells his water rights and permanently retires the
acreage with appurtenant duty and another farmer
purchases the water rights and enlarges his/her farm lot
proportionately to the amount being transferred. In
contrast, ground water pumps can be metered and,
moreover, the State Engineer can prevent cheating by
monitoring the electric or gas bills for energy used at the
pump.
The measurement of return-flow coefficients is also very
important. For example, the Alliance for the Rio Grade
Heritage, an environmental group in New Mexico, recently
accused the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, that
mainly supplies Rio Grande water to farmers, of diverting
about three times more water than it is entitled to. While
the Alliance for the Rio Grade Heritage is not aware of
return flows, the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
cannot effectively defend itself in the courts because it
does not posses reliable measurements of the return-flow
coefficients of the users under its jurisdiction. As
predicted by the Barzel rule (1989), facing the attempt of
the Alliance for the Rio Grande Heritage to capture some of
its water, The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District is
actively seeking funds for the installation of measurement
devices to monitor return flows back to the river.

Once either the bottom of the aquifer, or the steady-state
level is reached, the prior appropriation doctrine governing
surface water allocation is easily adapted to ground water:
Total consumptive use, pumping minus return flows is the
n

same as diversion minus return flows, [

∑ (1 -

Ri )( S i )

i =1

]. In surface water total consumptive use along the stream
is limited to the water flow at the source less the legally
required flow at some point downstream ( Ŝ - S ). In
pumping ground water from the aquifer, total consumptive
use is limited by the natural recharge (N). Also,
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CONCLUSION
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Water markets are ruled by self-interest groups always
comparing the additional benefit with the additional cost of
taking another step aimed at perfecting their water rights.
There is a fair amount of determinism in the process of
evolving water rights; in the future, as demand for water
continues to intensify, self interest groups will take steps,
small and large, moving in a track, leading eventually to the
prior appropriation doctrine. What I attempted to show in
this paper is that we already have in place an economic
theory that shows that if water rights are assigned
according to the prior appropriation doctrine, and are
based on consumptive use, and if markets are permitted to
allocate water among users, then water rights are traded
freely and allocated efficiently in the marketplace. A
century of experience in New Mexico confirms that water
markets governed by the prior appropriation doctrine
function smoothly. I believe that because of the
intensification of the demand for water in the west coast,
self-interest groups in California and other states will take
the necessary steps leading to water markets governed by
the prior appropriation doctrine.
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